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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has provided the
framework for unionization in the United States.  Many organizers and1
lawmakers have blamed coercive employers for the decline of union
membership in recent years.  For these detractors of the current labor situation2
in the United States, the NLRA itself provides the source of the coercion.3
Coupled with this problem is the NLRA’s inherent inability to guarantee
solutions for labor disputes.4
Under the NLRA, union organizers can request a representation election
when at least thirty percent of the workforce signs authorization cards in what
is known as a “card check.”  At this point in the process, the employer can5
choose to forego the election and simply recognize the union as a bargaining
unit, or can choose to move forward with the election.  The election is6
conducted via a secret ballot, and the union will be certified if it receives
support from a majority of the workers.  Despite the ability to vote in private,7
many union proponents are concerned with the activity that can occur during
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the vast amount of time prior to the actual election.  On average, it takes two8
years to complete a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election.  Union9
supporters see two problems with this large gap: ample time for anti-union
employer coercion, and a general loss of interest on the part of the employees
due to frustration with the system.10
If a union is successfully formed at a workplace, the NLRA mandates that
the union and the employer bargain collectively.  “[T]o bargain collectively11
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment . . . .”  Despite this obligation, some disputes may not be settled12
in this manner. When mere negotiation cannot bring the two sides into
accordance, a strike is an option that is protected by the NLRA.  Other than13
this recognition, the NLRA does not specifically set forth any other means for
settling disputes between employers and their organized labor force.14
Although strikes can be an effective means of ending disputes, they are costly
to both the employer and the employees. With a lack of palatable options
available when disputes arise, the current NLRA provides a flawed framework
for handling the delicate relationship that often exists between employers and
employees.
Because of these problems, it is easy to see why changes to the current
NLRA have been proposed. Such proposals have sparked harsh political
debate, as they reflect a controversial split between Democrats and
Republicans. However, in addition to the ideological arguments for and
against changes, the debate also includes fundamental constitutional
arguments that invoke speech, privacy, and property rights. For detractors of
the changes, these arguments should prevent the passage of any legislation, or
should warrant an overturning of that legislation if it ever passes into law.
This Note addresses the legal ramifications that could result from the
passage of the Employee Free Choice Act, a specific piece of proposed
legislation that seeks to cure the problems that many have with the current
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NLRA. Section II discusses this legislation and explains the changes that it
would make to the NLRA. Section III examines the constitutional arguments
that may prevent the legislation from surviving challenges following its
possible passage. Section IV analyzes these arguments using past precedent
and ultimately concludes that all of the questioned provisions of the legislation
would survive judicial challenges. Section V brings the Note to a conclusion.
II. THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
In response to the aforementioned criticism of the current NLRA, a bill
known as The Employee Free Choice Act (the Act) was introduced in the
United States House of Representatives on February 5, 2007.  The Act was15
meant to amend the existing NLRA,  and the House passed the Act on16
March 1, 2007 by a margin of 241 votes to 185.  Despite this success in the17
House, the Act ultimately fell nine votes short of the sixty votes needed to
break a Republican filibuster and send it to a vote in the Senate.  However,18
this failure did not kill the Act; rather, it was left open for possible
consideration should the votes later be obtained. Due to the overwhelming
Democratic support and the Republican opposition in the Senate,  it is likely19
that the newly increased population of Senate Democrats and the election of
Barack Obama as President will lead to a renewed interest in the Act and
possibly to its passage.20
The proposed Act contains two sections that specifically deal with the
previously discussed problems of the current NLRA.  Section 2 of the Act21
addresses the issue of an employer’s coercive tactics that may occur before an
NLRB election can take place.  In order to achieve this, the section eliminates22
elections in specific circumstances.  Section 3 of the Act addresses the23
inevitable disputes that arise between a newly formed union and the
150 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:147
24. H.R. 800 § 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases, Ch. 5
(2008), http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline_chap5.html.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006).
31. 153 CONG. REC. S8276–77 (1977).
32. See 153 CONG. REC. E463 (2007) (explaining some of the anti-union rhetoric that may take
place at this time).
33. H.R. 800 § 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
employer.  To counteract the possibility of harmful labor stoppages, this24
section introduces a limited form of mandatory arbitration.25
Section 2 would amend § 9(c) of the NLRA by adding a provision that
allows a union to be certified without an NLRB election.  Specifically, the26
Act states that the NLRB will investigate a petition to obtain union
representation if the petition alleges that a majority of employees support the
representation.  The Act goes on to state that if the Board determines that a27
majority of employees have indeed signed “valid authorizations,” the Board
shall not certify an NLRB election, but shall certify the labor organization.28
In other words, the Act would permit union certification if a majority of
employees signed valid authorization cards and only would require an election
if at least thirty percent, but less than fifty percent of employees signed
cards.  This is a stark contrast to the current NLRA framework, which29
permits the employer to decide whether or not an election should take place
when a majority of signatures has been obtained.  This provision also vastly30
limits the power of employers to influence the union selection process since
the lengthy time before elections will be removed;  a time in which employers31
can present their side of the unionization argument.32
Section 3 would amend § 8 of the NLRA by adding a provision that
mandates arbitration in the collective bargaining of the first contract if the two
parties are unable to reach an agreement.  First, the Act lays out a procedure33
to follow after a bargaining unit is initially certified. Once a union is certified,
the two sides should meet within ten days to bargain collectively and must
bargain in good faith, putting forth their best effort to reach an agreement.34
If the two parties cannot reach an agreement after ninety days, either party is
free to contact the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (Service).  At35
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this point, the Service will contact the parties and assist with the negotiations,
but will not directly adopt a contract.36
Finally, under § 3, a thirty day clock begins to toll after the Service is
contacted.  If the parties haves not agreed upon a contract after that thirty day37
period of mediation, the Act explains that the dispute will be sent to an
arbitrator.  That arbitrator then has the power to settle the dispute by creating38
a contract, which will be in effect for two years (unless a different time is
agreed upon by both parties).  In other words, if the two parties ultimately39
cannot reach an agreement, the Act provides that the federal government, not
the employer, will have the power to set the wages and other employment
benefits of a company’s union employees.40
III. OPPOSITION
1. Criticisms of Section 2
Detractors of the Act argue that reliance on “card check” in § 2 violates
two major constitutional rights. These opponents argue that this section
abridges the employers’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  The41
opponents also argue that § 2 strips employees of their Constitutional right to
privacy.42
In regard to the violation of an employer’s free speech rights, opponents
of the Act cite the elimination of the secret ballot elections as the source of the
problem.  Under the current NLRA, significant time often stands between the43
request for an NLRB election and the time when the election actually takes
place.  During this time, many employers take the opportunity to speak out44
against the formation of the union by explaining the possible and probable
consequences that would result from a unionized workforce.  Some of these45
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concerns can be of the utmost importance, and conveyance of them may be
vital in order to ensure the continued success and operation of the business.46
If the NLRB elections are eliminated, so too is this time period for speaking
out. Critics of the Act see the elimination of this opportunity to speak out
against a union as an unacceptable violation of that employer’s First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.  As Senator Mike Enzi explained,47
“The supporters of this bill . . . would seek to strip away even these limited
democratic rights and to kill off any opportunity for free speech and open
debate in the workplace.”  Following this reasoning, other opponents argue48
that “[t]here is simply no legitimate government interest in promoting
unionization that justifies a clandestine organizing campaign which denies all
speech rights to the unions’ adversaries.”49
With regard to the violation of an employee’s right to privacy, opponents
cite the coercion and pressure inherent in the card check process as the source
of the problem.  Under the current NLRA, a secret ballot election is likely to50
occur at the request of the employer even if a majority of employees sign.  As51
a result, regardless of whether or not an employee signs the card, he or she
will still have the opportunity to vote his or her true feelings in privacy.
Practically, this means that, should union leaders apply any form of pressure
toward employees; these employees have the option of acquiescing at the time,
but later voting differently when their identity is shielded. Furthermore, this
same logic also applies to employers who pressure employees not to support
the union. Withdrawing support in public, but voting in favor of the union in
private, is an available strategy under the current NLRA.
While these arguments represent strong policy questions surrounding the
Act, the question that remains is whether or not the reliance on card check
violates an employee’s Constitutional right to privacy.  Opponents of the Act52
ultimately fear that union leaders will begin to apply pressure to holdout
employees as the number of signed cards reaches a majority.  Opponents thus53
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feel that a private ballot, free of coercion, is essential to the process, and given
how much the decision will affect each employee’s life, they feel that the
absence of the secret ballot election is a violation of the employees’
Constitutional right to privacy.  Since citizens of this country are provided the54
protection of a secret ballot when selecting leaders, opponents argue that the
same protection unquestionably applies to the election of union leadership.55
2. Criticisms of Section 3
The Constitutional questions surrounding the mandatory arbitration
requirements in Section 3 of the Act focus mainly on the rights that are taken
away from employers as a result. “The idea that an arbitrator would be able
to set wages for two years should give pause to every employer. Simply stated,
an outsider determines fundamental issues such as wages, benefits and
working conditions.”  In addition to questions of fairness, opponents of the56
Act argue that stripping the employer of the power to set wages and other
benefits is unconstitutional.  These detractors argue that the Act violates the57
Fourteenth Amendment protection against the taking of property without
compensation and the freedom to contract.  Given that unsuccessful contracts58
can lead to the economic downturn of a business, taking away the right to
contract is the equivalent of the government taking away a valuable piece of
property without compensation.  Furthermore, any taking of this property59
right is only constitutional if the government provides due process to the entity
that is losing the property.  Opponents, like California Representative George60
Radanovich, also argue that the Act lacks any of the procedural safeguards,
such as the right to notice and to present evidence, necessary to ensure that the
businesses receive due process.  Even if the NLRB were to enact such61
procedures, the Act sets up no procedures for reviewing the decision of the
Board.  Without such procedures, and given the economic importance of62
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these contractual decisions, opponents of the Act view it as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. First Amendment Claims
The First Amendment prohibits the federal government from abridging
a person’s right to free speech.  The United States Supreme Court has63
examined the issue of whether or not the elimination of secret ballot elections
violates an employer’s right to free speech.  In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,64
the Court scrutinized three separate instances of grievances that were filed
against employers for unfair labor practices.  In each case, the union65
embarked on an organizational campaign and managed to obtain a majority of
card signatures from the employees.  The employers also put forth “vigorous66
antiunion campaigns” that resulted in numerous unfair labor practice charges
due to the coercive and threatening nature of the campaigns.  In each67
instance, NLRB elections were either not held, or their results were thrown
out because of the unfair labor practices of the employers.  As a result, the68
unions sought certification from the card signatures alone, and the employers
argued against that certification on numerous grounds.  One of those grounds69
was that the cards were insufficient to determine the true will of the
employees because “an employer has not had a chance to present his views
and thus a chance to insure that the employee choice was an informed one.”70
This contention mirrors the First Amendment argument, as both seek an
answer to the question of whether or not sole reliance on the card check
process violates an employer’s fundamental speech right.
The Court answered the free speech question in a manner that was
specifically tailored to the cases at that time.  It acknowledged that, under the71
NLRA, employers have the right to insist on an election unless they commit
unfair labor practices that are “likely to destroy the union’s majority and
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seriously impede the election.”  In fact, the Court acknowledged the72
superiority of elections over the card check process, but noted that “where an
employer engages in conduct disruptive of the election process, cards may be
the most effective—perhaps the only—way of assuring employee choice.”73
As a result, the Court reasoned that, in order for these unfair labor practices
to take place, the union would first have to be aware that the certification
campaign was taking place.  It also observed that oftentimes, it is the union74
who informs the employers of the campaign in order to subject them to the
unfair labor practice provisions, thus allowing them to proceed without an
election.  Given this knowledge, and the anti-union campaigns that resulted75
in the unfair labor practices, the Court reasoned that under the current NLRA,
employers have ample time to speak their minds, even without an election,
because this speech ultimately could lead to certification via card check only.76
Despite this apparent approval of the card check process, the Court’s
analysis would be overruled by the passage of the Act because a majority of
signatures allows the union to bypass an election regardless of whether unfair
labor practices take place.  As a result, the absence of an election would no77
longer mean that, by definition, the employer has spoken out against the
union. Fortunately, for proponents of the Act, the Court addressed the issue
of notice and opportunity to speak without incorporating unfair labor practices
into the analysis.  For instance, in National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel78
Packing Company, the union’s demand for recognition occurred only one
week prior to the outset of the campaign.  The Court held that the employer79
had sufficient time to influence the situation despite this short period because
“the employer was able to deliver a speech before the union obtained a
majority.”  This analysis implies that the employer does not have the right to80
speak out during the specific time period before an NLRB election takes
place. Instead, this shows that the employer simply has the right to speak out
against the union at some point in time.
When this analysis is applied to the First Amendment argument against
the Act, it is apparent that the argument would fail. By passing the Act, the
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government would not be taking away the right of an employer to speak out
against a union. The government simply would be taking away a time period
which allows employers to speak out.  It is hard to imagine a situation where81
union supporters would be able to hide a certification drive from an employer.
While it is true that some solicitation would take place outside of work, it is
also true that recruiting will be done, to some degree, on the premises.
Employers may see organizers, may overhear employees discussing union
issues, or may be directly informed about the organizational drive by the
employees. In any of those situations, the employer is put on notice of the
existence of the drive. The moment that an employer learns of such a drive,
that employer is free to present the reasons why the union should not be
formed. This is a freedom that will not be taken away by the Act.
In the rare instances where the campaign remains a secret, there is nothing
in the Act that prevents an employer from routinely communicating with
employees about the potential negative effects of union formation at that
particular workplace. If an employer believes that the business would suffer
and possibly fold under union control, it is in management’s best interest to
inform the employees of these reasons. This type of preemptive strike is
currently well within an employer’s rights and will not be taken away by the
Act.
For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the free speech argument
would be successful. The Act simply eliminates a specific period of time when
employers often speak out against unions, not an employer’s right to speak out
against a union altogether.82
2. Employee Privacy Claims
Although a right to privacy is not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, it has been inferred from numerous amendments such as the First
Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.  Opponents argue that this right to83
privacy is being taken away by the Act’s reliance on card check.  The Court84
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in Gissel faced a similar argument.  There, the employers argued that85
“without a secret ballot an employee may, in a card drive, succumb to group
pressures or sign simply to get the union ‘off his back’ and then be unable to
change his mind as he would be free to do once inside a voting booth.”  This86
argument contends that sole reliance on card check campaigns for certification
takes away an employee’s freedom to vote privately, resulting in coerced
results. However, the Court concluded that the influence of union leaders
remains the same in card check certification and secret ballot elections
because “election cases arise most often with small bargaining units where
virtually every voter’s sentiments can be carefully and individually
canvassed.”  In other words, the Court ruled that privacy does not really exist87
in any type of union certification campaign because unions normally do an
excellent job of accounting for all employees necessary to obtain approval.88
Under this reasoning, opponents of the Act cannot argue that relying on
the card check process violates an employee’s right to privacy. If privacy
never existed, it is impossible for the government to take it away. However,
the Court’s analysis is questionable when applied to practical situations.
The Court assumes that a union would know how the employees voted
even if the votes were cast in private.  This assumption is based upon the89
knowledge of voter sentiment, as well as, presumably, the results of the
election itself.  What these assumptions fail to acknowledge is the argument90
that employees may express support for the union during the card drive, but
vote against it during the election. Unions not only have a reputation of
assisting employees, but also have a reputation of using intimidation to enlist
support. In the face of pressure that could range from embarrassment in front
of fellow employees to threats of physical or financial harm, it is not hard to
imagine that some employees may agree to support the union in public, but
then rescind that support in the privacy of a voting booth. In these cases, even
the sentiment of an apparently staunch supporter could not be accurately
tracked. In other words, although union organizers may factor one’s public
sentiment and card signature into their approval numbers, they never can truly
know for sure which employees voted as expected.
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For this reason, the employee free speech argument stands some chance
of success. Union organizers may like to believe that they can determine how
each employee will vote, but given the coercive nature of many organizational
drives, such predictability is highly unlikely. As a result, employees currently
enjoy some type of privacy via the secret ballot election process, a privacy that
would be taken away by the Act. However, as it stands now, the Supreme
Court does not recognize this privacy at all. Even though there is a compelling
argument that the Act takes away a fundamental employee right, opponents
will have the daunting task of overturning the existing precedent.  In the end,91
it is this precedent that makes a successful challenge unlikely.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no state
shall deny any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”  Regarding the mandatory arbitration principle of the Act and its92
relation to the Fourteenth Amendment, opponents of the Act point to the
Supreme Court case of Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations.  In Wolff Packing, the Court reviewed a Kansas statute that set93
industrial working principles such as employee wages, work hours, and
overtime pay.  The Court found that this statute violated the Fourteenth94
Amendment:
The system of compulsory arbitration which the Act establishes is intended to
compel, and if sustained will compel, the owner and employees to continue the
business on terms which are not of their making. . . . Such a system infringes the
liberty of contract and rights of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.95
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The Court viewed mandatory arbitration as an unconstitutional limitation
on the freedom to contract, equaling a taking of property because it decided
how an owner should run his or her own business.  Using this case as a96
benchmark, it is easy to see how critics of the Act would feel that its
mandatory arbitration principles are unconstitutional.
Wolff Packing was decided in 1925, during an era in which economic
regulations were often struck down due to freedom of contract principles. The
seminal case that defined that era was Lochner v. New York.  In Lochner, a97
New York statute made it illegal to employ bakery employees for more than
sixty hours a week.  The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional,98
reasoning that “the freedom of master and employee to contract with each
other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be
prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”99
Following the stock market crash in 1929 and the New Deal, freedom of
contract principles were called into question, culminating in the landmark
decision of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.  In Parrish, the Court100
recognized that the working class was in an unequal bargaining position to
that of their employers.  As a result, it upheld a statute that set minimum101
wages for women,  and in doing so, established the long-standing principle102
that economic regulations will only be struck down if they are arbitrary and
capricious, and if the goals of the regulations bear no rational relation to the
means of achieving those goals.103
With this new regulatory standard in place, the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of mandatory arbitration in collective bargaining agreements. In H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, a union wished to have the employer deduct or
“check-off” union dues from employee pay.  Although it was common104
practice for employers to deduct other expenses from paychecks, the company
refused to do so, not out of inconvenience or cost, but because they refused to
“aid and comfort the union.”  Because of this stance, the union filed a105
grievance with the NLRB, and the Board found that “the refusal of the
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company to bargain about the check-off was not made in good faith, but was
done solely to frustrate the making of any collective-bargaining agreement.”106
As a result, the Board ordered the company to further resume bargaining with
the union and when doing so, to stop bargaining in bad faith.  The union107
interpreted this order as one that forced the company to accept the deduction
proposal, rather than simply discussing possible alternatives.  The D.C.108
Court of Appeals later agreed with this interpretation, leaving the Supreme
Court to decide whether or not the NLRB had the power to compel the
employer to deduct the dues from the employees’ wages.109
The Court held that the NLRB has the power to require parties to
continue negotiating with each other, but does not have the power to force
either party to accept any provisions set forth during collective bargaining.110
In reaching this decision, the Court focused on § 8(d) of the NLRA, which
states that “such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession.”  In light of this portion of the NLRA,111
the Court argued that “allowing the Board to compel agreement when the
parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise
on which the Act is based—private bargaining under governmental
supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the
actual terms of the contract.”112
Although this seems to be an indictment of the mandatory arbitration
portions of the Employee Free Choice Act, the Court limited this decision to
the current NLRA.  Responding to the argument that the current NLRA is113
insufficient to handle labor disputes, the Court said that “it is the job of
Congress, not the Board or the courts, to decide when and if it is necessary to
allow governmental review of proposals for collective-bargaining agreements
and compulsory submission to one side’s demands.”  In other words, the114
Court acknowledged that although the current NLRA does not allow
mandatory arbitration, Congress has the power to amend the NLRA to include
such a provision. In line with the principles of Parrish, such an amendment
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would be appropriate as long as the desired ends of the legislation were
rationally related to the means.115
The mandatory arbitration principle in Section 3 of the Act is similar to
the type of amendment that was envisioned in H.K. Porter.  Given this116
general approval by the Court, the amendment would only have to pass the
rational basis test established in Parrish in order to survive any challenges to
its constitutionality.  Under this test, it is unlikely that the Court would strike117
the amendment down. For instance, should the amendment be called into
question, it could be argued that the goal is to alleviate any potentially harmful
work stoppages that are likely to occur after a newly-recognized union is
certified. Since the goal inherent in any form of arbitration is to settle disputes
that two or more parties may have, it could be argued that mandatory
arbitration is rationally related to the goal of avoiding work stoppages. This
argument fits well within the flexible framework set forth in Parrish,  and118
the amendment itself falls within the Congressional power recognized in H.K.
Porter.119
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the Employee Free Choice Act is a controversial
political issue. There are numerous arguments for and against the Act that
ultimately will affect its ability to pass into law. Given the current structure
of Congress and the Presidency, the likelihood of passage has grown
significantly. Should this occur, it is highly likely that the opponents of the
Act will question its Constitutional validity on at least one of the three main
issues discussed earlier.
If and when this occurs, there is no guarantee that current Supreme Court
precedent will be followed. Precedent has been overturned numerous times
throughout history due to social changes or to ideological changes in the
make-up of the Court. However, under the current standing of the law, it
appears as though each of the three major challenges outlined above will be
unsuccessful.
The challenge to the free speech rights of employers will be unsuccessful
given the fact that the Act merely eliminates a time period for employer
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speech without eliminating the speech altogether. Of the three challenges, the
violation of privacy argument has the best chance of succeeding; however,
given the current state of the law, courts most likely will strike down the
challenge on the grounds that a privacy right never existed in the first place.
Finally, the challenge to the contract and property rights of the employers will
be unsuccessful because of the limitations placed upon the freedom to
contract.
In the end, should the Act survive a bitter political battle, it likely will
remain sound law even in the face of numerous court battles.
